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Abstract 
Recent literature on multinational firms has stressed the importance of low productivity 
as a barrier to the cross-border expansion of firms. But firms may also need external fi-
nance to shoulder the costs of entering foreign markets. We develop a model of multina-
tional firms facing real and financial barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), and we 
analyze their impact on the FDI decision (the extensive margin) and foreign affiliate 
sales (the intensive margin). We provide empirical evidence based on a detailed dataset 
of German multinationals which contains information on parent-level and affiliate-level 
financial constraints as well as about the location the foreign affiliates. We find that fi-
nancial factors constrain firms’ foreign investment decisions, an effect felt in particular 
by large firms. Financial constraints at the parent level matter for the extensive, but less 
so for the intensive margin. For the intensive margin, financial constraints at the affiliate 
level are relatively more important. 
Keywords:  multinational firms, heterogeneity, productivity, financial con-
straints 
JEL-classification: F2,  G2 
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1  Motivation 
Multinational firms are larger than their domestic counterparts. For European firms, 
Mayer and Ottaviano et al. (2007) show that multinational firms are also more produc-
tive, generate higher value added, pay higher wages, employ more capital per worker, 
and they employ a larger number of skilled workers. In the theoretical literature, the 
characteristic size patterns of multinational firms are explained mainly by differences in 
productivity. According to this explanation, observed internationalization patterns re-
flect real constraints since only the more productive firms can afford to shoulder the 
fixed costs of market entry. 
These stylized facts are confirmed by our data for German companies, where firms 
owning foreign affiliates are indeed substantially larger than purely domestic firms 
(Graph 1a). Yet, the two groups of firms also differ in a number of other respects. Mul-
tinational firms, for instance, have lower debt ratios and higher cash flows. This sug-
gests difficulties in obtaining external finance as an additional impediment to foreign 
expansions.
1 However, most of the theoretical literature considers the impact of finan-
cial constraints to be of lesser importance, arguing that foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and the associated financing decisions can largely be treated separately.
2 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the (relative) importance of real and financial bar-
riers for the cross-border expansion of firms. In doing so, we distinguish between the 
decision to enter a foreign market for the first time (the extensive margin) and the deci-
sion on the volume of foreign affiliate sales (the intensive margin). We proceed in two 
steps.  
In a first step, we theoretically analyze how productivity and financial constraints affect 
a firm’s choice to become a multinational firm under conditions of limited internal 
funds and the need to obtain external debt finance. Our model features limited contract 
enforceability and liquidation costs as two sources of inefficiencies in financial con-
tracting that are particularly relevant for foreign investments. The model provides a set 
                                                 
1   In the crisis that started in 2007, for instance, an increasing number of German firms reports credit 
constraints as an impediment to expansion into foreign countries (DIHK 2009). 
2   See, for example, Markusen (2002).   2
of testable implications concerning the impact of financial constraints, productivity, and 
host-country characteristics on firms’ internationalization choices. In particular, we pre-
dict that financial constraints are more likely to affect the extensive than the intensive 
margin, unless financial constraints are severe. Furthermore, we predict that financial 
constraints are more strongly felt for large firms, as they are more likely to be interested 
in foreign expansion.  
In a second step, we provide empirical evidence using data for German firms. We obtain 
information on the foreign affiliates of German firms from a detailed firm-level data-
base provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Direct Investment Micro-Database 
(MiDi). Furthermore, we use data on the balance sheets of firms in Germany from the 
Dafne database provided by Bureau van Dijk and the Hoppenstedt database. Our data 
are unique as they allow measuring financial constraints and productivities at the parent 
level for domestic firms and for multinationals, as well as financial constraints at the 
affiliate level. This enables us to analyze the extensive and the intensive margins of 
FDI. Furthermore, we can evaluate the relative importance of financial constraints at the 
parent and at the affiliate level, a question that has – to the best of our knowledge – not 
been addressed in the literature so far. In contrast to earlier work focusing on manufac-
turing firms, our sample also contains services firms. 
Our research is motivated by recent theoretical work stressing the importance of produc-
tivity for firms’ international expansions. Seminal papers focusing on firms’ export de-
cisions are Bernard et al. (2003) and (Melitz 2003). Helpman et al. (2004) extend the 
Melitz model to account for multinational firms. The key to these models is that, ex 
ante, firms do not know the firms’ productivity. Upon entry, firms draw their productiv-
ity from a commonly known productivity distribution, and the level of productivity be-
comes common knowledge as well. Depending on the level of productivity, firms exit 
the market, they produce only for the domestic market, they become exporters, or they 
set up affiliates abroad.  
The implicit assumption of these models is that firms can finance foreign operations in-
ternally and/or without incurring an external finance premium. Recent papers introduce 
financial constraints into the Melitz model. The focus of these models is on firms’ deci-
sions to export. Chaney (2005) predicts that financially constrained firms are less likely 
to be able to cover the fixed costs of exporting. Manova (2006) examines the interaction   3
of productivity and credit constraints and their impact on the export decision as well as 
the volume of export.  
Recent empirical work shows that financial frictions indeed affect export behavior. Us-
ing panel data on bilateral exports at the country level, Manova (2006) finds that finan-
cially more developed countries are more likely to export, and that the effect is more 
pronounced in financially vulnerable sectors. Firm-level studies show that financial con-
straints matter more for the extensive margin than for the intensive margin of exports 
(Berman and Héricourt 2008), that export starters enjoy better financial conditions (Bel-
lone et al. 2008), and that financially healthy firms are more likely to export 
(Greenaway et al. 2007).
3 Stiebale (2008), in contrast, finds no effect of financial con-
straints on a firm’s export decision once observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity is 
accounted for.  
This paper provides complementary evidence on the role of financial frictions for FDI. 
As predicted by our model, we find that productivity and financial constraints have a 
significant impact on German firms’ internationalization decision. Economically, pro-
ductivity and financial constraints are of similar importance, but financial constraints 
matter most to the subset of firms that consider investing abroad. Our model also sug-
gests that the extensive margin is more likely to be affected than the intensive margin, 
unless financial constraints are severe. Our empirical analysis shows that parent finan-
cial constraints have indeed a negative impact on the extensive margin of FDI, but less 
so on the intensive margin, mirroring findings by Berman and Héricourt (2008) for ex-
ports. However, we also find that, in contrast to the parent-level constraints, the affili-
ate’s financial constraints matter for the intensive margin. This observation points to-
wards a hierarchy of financing the intensive margin, with affiliate financing being pre-
ferred over parent financing. 
In the following section, we present our model of multinational firms. In section three, 
we describe our data and provide descriptive statistics. Section four provides empirical 
evidence, and section five concludes.  
                                                 
3   Evidence on the reverse causality from exporting to financial conditions is mixed (Bellone et al. 
2008, Greenaway et al. 2007).   4
2  Finance and the Margins of FDI: Theory 
In this section, we analyze a firm’s choice to become a multinational firm and the sales 
of its foreign affiliates in the presence of financial constraints. Firms incur fixed costs of 
market entry as well as variable costs of production. They finance their foreign expan-
sion using internally generated funds as well as an external bank credit, potentially se-
cured by collateral. Financing decisions are made under uncertainty.  
Financial constraints are firm-specific; they do not merely reflect differences across 
firms with regard to productivity. We do not specify the sources of “financial heteroge-
neity” but there are several reasons why firms may have different financial constraints. 
Firms differ, for instance, with regard to their customer structure and, thus, the probabil-
ity of being hit by an adverse demand shock. Firms also differ with regard to the quality 
of their management and, thus, the ability of outside lenders to extract information on 
the profitability of an investment project. 
Financial contracting in our model suffers from potential inefficiencies due to limited 
enforceability of financial contracts, a problem particularly relevant when investing in a 
foreign country. Enforceability differs across countries and may be linked to the devel-
opment of the financial market as well as the presence of home country banks abroad. 
With limited contract enforcement, collateral may be required to obtain credit financing. 
However, collecting and liquidating collateral generates transaction costs, and the 
amount of collateral available may be limited. The need for costly and limited collateral 
confines the use of external finance and thus the foreign expansion of firms.  
To see how the model works, consider the decision problem of a multinational firm that 
can invest abroad to serve the foreign market.
4 The firm’s alternative investment option 
is normalized to zero.
5 To set up a foreign affiliate, the firm has to incur a fixed cost of 
market entryF . Once the firm has decided to set up a foreign affiliate, it has to choose 
the level of sales. Thus, we capture both the extensive and the intensive margins of the 
firm’s foreign expansion strategy. To fix ideas, consider the following variable produc-
                                                 
4    We focus on horizontal FDI. The qualitative implications of our model with regard to the impact of 
financial constraints would also go through for vertical FDI. 
5   It is straightforward to extend our model and to include an outside option like exports that depends 
positively on the firm’s productivity. As we show in Buch et al. (2009), the firm’s productivity level 
matters relatively more for the investment opportunity abroad than for the outside option of export-
ing. The qualitative results of our model are unchanged.   5
tion cost function,






x k , where x denotes the quantity produced and sold by 
the foreign affiliate. The productivity of the parent firm, which also spills over onto the 
foreign affiliate, is captured by β . The larger the fixed cost of entry and the lower a 
firm’s productivity, the larger are the “real barriers” that a firm faces when entering for-
eign markets. 
The firm also faces a “financial barrier” in the form of a cash-in-advance constraint be-
cause set up and production costs have to be paid before production starts and before 
revenues are generated. Revenues that can be generated on the foreign market are uncer-
tain. Serving the foreign market yields positive revenues  px with probability q and 
zero revenues with probability() q − 1 , where  p is the foreign price level.
6 
Benchmark case without liquidity constraints 
Before we describe the impact of financial constraints on investment decisions, consider 
as a benchmark the first-best situation where the firm is not liquidity constrained. The 
firm can finance both the fixed cost of entry and the variable cost of production from 
internal fundsL. Thus, it maximizes the following profit function: 
(1)  F
x
qpx F x k qpx −
+
− = − − =





Taking the first-order condition, solving for the optimal sales of the affiliate 
qp xFB ) 1 ( β + =  and inserting it back into the profit function (1) yields the following 
profits under the first-best solution (FB): 
(1’)  F p q FB − + = ) 1 (
2
1 2 2 β π  
Thus, if liquidity is not an issue, the investment takes place if and only if  0 ≥ FB π , i.e. if 
net profits of the investment are positive. Not surprisingly, profits depend positively on 
the firm’s productivity (β ), i.e. less productive firms are less likely to be able to cover 
the fixed cost of market entry.  
                                                 
6   We abstract from exchange rate changes, i.e. revenues generated on the foreign market can be remit-
ted 1:1 into domestic currency. Russ (2007) has a model in which endogenous adjustment of ex-
change rates affects firms’ entry decisions.    6
Foreign expansion with liquidity constraints 
Consider now the situation where the firm is liquidity constrained, which we define as a 
situation in which its liquid assets L are not sufficient to cover the costs associated with 
market entry and production. Thus, the firm needs external finance. We assume that ex-
ternal finance is raised in the form of debt finance and, specifically, credits from banks. 
Firms can obtain credits from domestic or foreign banks. We do not model this choice 
explicitly and hence do not impose restrictions with regard to the degree of integration 
of financial markets. However, domestic and foreign banks may differ with regard to 
their ability to enforce contracts. For instance, if domestic banks maintain affiliates in 
the foreign country, too, they are in a better position than banks operating abroad solely 
to monitor the affiliates and collect collateral. This adds to the comparative advantage 
that they already have in terms of knowledge about the domestic parent. The focus on 
external debt finance assumption reflects the fact that external equity finance plays a 
limited role for German firms (Bayraktar et al. 2005). Also, theoretical considerations 
suggest a “pecking order” of external finance according to which external equity finance 
and portfolio capital are dominated by bank lending.  
Let D denote the credit necessary to finance the fixed and variable costs of entry for a 
production levelx, given the available liquid fundsL, i.e.  L F x k D − + = ) (.  F u r t h e r -
more, let  D r) 1 ( + denote the repayment of principal plus interest payment that the firm 
is supposed to pay. Like Manova (2006) and others, we assume that credit repayment is 
possible only if the revenues from foreign sales are positive. In particular, we rule out 
the possibility that the parent firm steps in and repays the affiliate’s credit if the affiliate 
is not able to do so. This implies also that the credit repayment  D r ) 1 ( + cannot exceed 
the revenues px, i.e.  px D r ≤ + ) 1 ( . Banks are assumed to operate competitively and to 
determine the interest rate such as to just break even in expected terms.  
To capture enforcement problems in financial contracts, we assume that credit repay-
ment cannot be enforced with certainty, even if revenues are positive, but only with 
probability  μ , with 1 0 < ≤ μ . The enforcement parameter μ  has two interpretations. 
On the one hand, it can reflect different institutional quality across countries. Legal sys-
tems may, for instance, differ with regard to the degree of creditor friendliness and the   7
enforceability of contracts.
7 On the other hand, it could reflect a greater presence of 
home-country multinational banks in the host country. These banks may be able to ac-
quire useful information on the host-country environment and be able to monitor firms 
more closely through their affiliates abroad. This reduces informational asymmetries 
and makes it more likely that credit enforcement is successful. 
The firm can collateralize (part) of its credit with assets from two potential sources. 
First, the firm can pledge its fixed cost investment in the foreign affiliate, F, as collat-
eral. Second, the firm can use an exogenously given collateral, C , provided by the par-
ent company, to secure the credit. Let  F C C + ≤  denote the collateral actually chosen 
to secure the credit, the exact value of which is determined endogenously below. If the 
credit is not repaid, the creditor can seize the collateral to cover her losses. However, 
she can realize only a fraction θ of the collateral when liquidating it.
8 Thus, liquidating 
the collateral involves a dead weight loss of  C ) 1 ( θ − .  
There are two situations where liquidation of a collateral (potentially) becomes an issue. 
Suppose the affiliate has positive revenues but the creditor fails to be able to enforce the 
repayment. Then, the bank has the option to liquidate the collateral. However, it would 
be inefficient to do so, due to the dead weight loss of liquidation. In this case, we as-
sume that efficient renegotiation will make the firm pay C θ , i.e. the amount that the 
bank can realize from liquidating the collateral, to avoid inefficient liquidation, and the 
bank will accept this offer.
9 If revenues are not positive, however, liquidation of the col-
lateral cannot be avoided.  
Now, consider the zero profit condition for banks which determines the interest rate for 
a given choice of C: 
(2)  D C q D r q = − + + θ μ μ ) 1 ( ) 1 (  
Banks obtain the promised credit repayment  D r) 1 ( +  only if credit repayment can be 
enforced. In all other cases, they obtain the liquidation value of the collateral, C θ , either 
                                                 
7   Harrison et al. (2004) report that financial development lowers financial constraints. 
8   Without loss of generality, we assume that the efficiency loss is the same for both kinds of collateral 
goods. 
9   This assumes that the firm can hold the bank down to its outside option of liquidating the collateral. It 
would be straightforward to modify this assumption and let the two parties split the gains from not 
liquidating the collateral. However, given our assumption of a perfectly competitive banking market, 
the first assumption seems to be the most convincing one.   8
because this is what the firm pays voluntarily, after renegotiation, or this is what they 
receive from actually liquidating the collateral. Solving for (1+r)D, we find that banks 
charge a risk premium over and above the risk-free rate which is declining in the prob-
ability of success of the project (q) and in the efficiency of the liquidation procedure, 
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Note that the smallerμ , the more important it is to pledge a collateral for this condition 
to be satisfied. However, due to the dead weight loss in case the collateral is actually 
liquidated, which happens with positive probability, the firm limits the collateral 
pledged to the minimum required to obtain the desired credit. Inserting 
L F x k D − + = ) (  and solving for C yields the minimum collateral needed to finance the 
fixed cost of market entry and a given level of affiliate sales x, taking into account that 
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The larger the required credit, the larger is the minimum collateral needed. Note, how-
ever, that the collateral cannot exceed the upper bound specified above,  F C + . We 
consider, in turn, the cases where this upper bound of collateral constrains the firm’s 
optimal sales choice and where it does not, starting with the case of a non-binding col-
lateral constraint. 
2.1  Non-Binding Collateral Constraint 
Suppose for a moment that the collateral constraint is not binding. Then, for a given 
level of affiliate sales x and collateral C, the firm expects the following profits: 
(6)   D F x k C q C q D r q qpx + + − − − − − + − = ] ) ( [ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( θ μ μ π .   9
The first term reflects the expected revenues, the second term the debt repayment that 
can be enforced with probability μ  if revenues are positive, which happens with prob-
ability q. If credit repayment cannot be enforced, the firm voluntarily pays what the 
bank would be able to collect in the event of liquidation,  C θ , to avoid costly liquida-
tion, as discussed above. If revenues are not positive, however, the collateral will be liq-
uidated, as captured by the fourth term. The last terms capture the cost of market entry 
and production and the credit obtained by the firm to finance these costs. 
The firm maximizes its profits by choosing the optimal sales of the affiliate x, taking 
into account the collateral needed to finance market entry and production,  ) ( * x C : 
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qpx L F x k
q F x k qpx   
Note that if  0 ) ( * = x C , i.e. if no collateral is needed to secure the credit, financing 
costs do not bias the investment decision. If collateral is needed, however, expected 
profits are lowered by the expected liquidation cost,  ) ( * ) 1 )( 1 ( x C q θ − − . 
The following proposition characterizes the solutions of the firm’s maximization prob-
lem. 
 
Proposition 1: Non-Binding Collateral Constraint – Extensive and Intensive Margins
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π      
provided that the maximum exogenous collateral is not binding, i.e.  
F x C C − ≥ *) ( *  
Proof: See Appendix 
Note that for 1 = μ , the optimum level of sales is the same as the first-best level. Also, if 
1 = θ , then  0 = z , and again the optimum level of sales is the same as in the first-best 
case. Thus, the optimum level of sales differs from the first-best choice only if both 
1 < μ  and  1 < θ . The intuition for this is straightforward. Only if contract enforcement 
is less than perfect, may a collateral be required to obtain a credit, and only if the use of 
a collateral is costly does it affect the marginal cost of financing the production. Thus, 
only if a costly collateral is required do profits fall short of first-best profits. 
Of course, the firm will engage in FDI only if the maximum profits from investment are 
non-negative. The following proposition characterizes the comparative statics for the 
firm’s extensive and intensive margins of investment. 
 
Proposition 2: Non-Binding Collateral Constraint – Comparative Statics 
Changes in the following parameters affect the probability of non-negative profits and 





































Furthermore, the intensive margin is described by the following comparative static re-




























Proof: See Appendix 
The optimal volume of sales and the firm’s profits increase in the firm’s productivity 
and in the lucrativeness of foreign markets. Furthermore, better contract enforcement in   11
the host country has a positive effect on sales and profits because it lowers the require-
ment to use costly collateral, and improving the efficiency of liquidating collateral re-
duces costs. Higher fixed cost lower expected profits not only directly but also indi-
rectly. The larger the fixed cost, the fewer liquid funds are left for financing the invest-
ment. Less liquid funds, in turn, mean greater need for using costly collateral. Hence, 
there is an indirect negative effect of fixed cost over and above the direct effect. How-
ever, fixed cost and internal funds do not affect the optimal level of sales choice because 
the marginal cost of using collateral does not depend on how much collateral is actually 
needed. The maximum collateral, in turn, has no effect on profits and on the firm’s 
choice of sales as long as it does not impose a binding constraint.  
This scenario describes the situation of a mildly financially constrained investor. The 
need for credit financing and the requirement of providing collateral increase the mar-
ginal cost of investment and hence limit the volume of sales and profits. However, as 
long as the collateral requirement does not impose a binding constraint, the constraints 
are not as severe, as fixed cost and internal funds affect the extensive margin only, not 
the intensive margin. 
2.2  Binding Collateral Constraint 
Consider now the case where the collateral constraint is binding for the optimal sales 
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In this case,  * x  cannot be implemented because the credit constraint becomes binding. 
Instead, production settles at a smaller level x  that is determined by the maximum 
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Solving this equation for x  and inserting it into the firm’s profit function, yields the 
constrained optimal level of sales choices and profits as characterized by the following 
Proposition. 
    12
Proposition 3: Binding Collateral Constraint – Extensive and Intensive Margins 
Suppose the maximum exogenous collateral imposes a binding constraint on the firm’s 
optimal choice of the level of sales, i.e.  
(11)  F x C C − < *) ( *  
Then, the investor can attain a maximum profit of   
(12)  * ] )[ 1 )( 1 ( ] ) ( [ π θ π ≤ + − − − + − = F C q F x k x qp  
Where the level of sales  * x x <  is determined by equation (10) 
Proof: See Appendix 
Not surprisingly, profits fall short of the second-best profits that can be attained if the 
collateral constraint is non-binding. The following proposition characterizes the com-
parative static results for the extensive and intensive margins. 
 
Proposition 4: Binding Collateral Constraint – Comparative Statics 
The following comparative static results characterize the extensive margins of FDI, 
summarizing which parameters are more or less likely to ensure non-negative profits: 



































Furthermore, the intensive margin is described by the following comparative statics for 
the optimal volume of foreign affiliate sales: 


























Proof: See Appendix   13
Like above, productivity, lucrativeness of foreign markets, contract enforcement, and 
the efficiency of collateral liquidation positively affect both the extensive and the inten-
sive margin of foreign direct investment. Unlike before, however, fixed costs and inter-
nal funds now affect the level of sales as well, because higher fixed cost (or fewer inter-
nal funds) leave fewer funds for the financing of the production, which cannot be com-
pensated by increasing credit financing if the collateral constraint becomes binding. And 
of course both margins are positively affected if the collateral constraint becomes less 
binding.  
We also find that the financial status of the firm as captured by the liquid funds and the 
collateral available plays a more important role for more productive firms, since they 
are the ones more likely to invest. Thus, a high productivity is a necessary, but not a suf-
ficient condition for foreign expansion. 
This scenario captures the case of a more severely financially constrained firm that is 
not only exposed to higher marginal cost of credit financing, but that is also constrained 
in its access to collateral. The firm is constrained not only at the extensive, but also at 
the intensive margin of expansion. Of course, in reality, the two cases may be consid-
ered as representing the two limits of a continuous distribution, with marginal cost of 
using a collateral increasing in the size of the collateral. It would be straightforward to 
generalize our set up and to allow for a more continuous distribution of financial con-
straints.  
2.3  Financial Constraints at the Affiliate Level 
So far, we have assumed the liquid funds (L) and the exogenous collateral (C ) to be 
provided by the parent firm. For the market entry decision, this is the natural assump-
tion. Over time, however, the foreign affiliate may in turn accumulate earnings and col-
lateral goods that may affect the financing constraints for the volume of sales.  A natural 
extension of the model would thus be to take into account liquid funds and collateral 
goods provided by the affiliate itself. It seems plausible to conjecture that funds pro-
vided by the affiliate incur lower opportunity cost and/or dead weight losses than funds   14
provided by the parent firm.
10 If this is the case, we would expect funds provided by the 
affiliate to be used first, and only if they are not sufficient would we expect them to be 
supplemented by funds provided by the parent. 
2.4  Summing Up 
The model has rich implications for the determinants of firms’ intensive and extensive 
margins of foreign activities. Higher productivity, more efficient liquidation of collat-
eral, better contract enforcement, and more lucrative foreign markets always increase 
the volume of affiliate sales. Higher fixed costs decrease and higher internal funds in-
crease activities. The impact of these variables on the intensive margin depends on 
whether the collateral constraint is binding. They have no effect on the intensive margin 
if the available collateral is sufficiently large. Likewise, the impact of the size of the 
collateral depends on the scenario considered. It should matter most when the collateral 
available is low. Finally, our model predicts that financial constraints matter more for 
larger, more productive firms, since these firms are more likely to be interested in for-
eign expansions. Table 1 gives an overview of the results of the comparative static 
analyses.  
3  Data and Stylized Facts 
3.1  Data Sources
11  
To investigate the importance of real and financial constraints for the foreign investment 
choices of firms, we use data from three sources. Dafne and Hoppenstedt are commer-
cial databases providing financial information on a large panel of firms that are active in 
Germany.
12 We use these datasets to obtain information on parent-level financial con-
straints and productivity. Information on the number of German firms’ foreign affiliates, 
their sales, the host countries, and affiliate-level financial constraints are obtained from 
                                                 
10   This is a topic discussed extensively in the literature on internal capital markets. See for example 
Brusco and Panunzi (2005) or Inderst and Laux (2005). For a survey see Stein (2003). 
11   See Table 2 in the Appendix for details. 
12   Dafne is the German equivalent to the European firm-level database Amadeus. Bayraktar et al. (2005) 
also use the German data from Amadeus for an analysis of firm-level domestic investment behaviour.   15
the firm-level database on multinational firms MiDi (Microdatabase Direct Investment), 
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (Lipponer 2008).  
To eliminate outliers, we start from the full Dafne dataset and drop firms with negative 
values for key variables such as sales and total assets. Also, as we need information on 
cash flow and sales, we eliminate observations for firms which do not report an income 
statement. We additionally truncate some of the data at the 1
st and 99
th percentile. Fi-
nally, we drop observations showing large changes in sales or in the number of employ-
ees from one year to another (increase by a factor of 10 or drop to 1/10 or less) in order 
to control for possible merger-induced outliers. 
Table 4 compares the structure of the sample after the outlier correction (“corrected 
sample” and the sample used for the regressions in Table 6 (“regression sample”). The 
two samples are fairly similar in terms of the percentage allocation of the number of 
firms across sectors. We have also compared the structure of our sample to the sectoral 
structure of the German economy as a whole, and the rank correlation in terms of sec-
toral structure of sales has proven to be quite high.  
3.2  Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Extensive and Intensive Margin 
By merging the firm-level databases Dafne and Hoppenstedt with information on the 
foreign affiliates of German firms provided in MiDi, we obtain a dataset which includes 
two groups of firms. The first group contains purely domestic German firms, i.e. firms 
which do not hold affiliates abroad (‘Domestic Firms’) (94.5 % of the firm-year obser-
vations). The second group consists of German firms with foreign affiliates (‘German 
MNEs’) (5.5 %). From MiDi, we also obtain a count variable on the number of affiliates 
that a given parent operates abroad. This serves as an additional proxy for the extensive 
margin of foreign activities, which measures complex FDI strategies involving many 
affiliates. We also have information on the volume of a firm’s foreign affiliates’ sales as 
a measure of the intensive margin.  
Productivity 
In line with the theoretical model, we use cost efficiency as a firm-level measure of pro-
ductivity. Cost efficiency is given by parent sales over total costs, i.e. labor costs plus   16
the costs of other inputs. A higher value reflects higher cost efficiency, hence we expect 
a positive sign. Higher sales relative to total costs might also reflect higher mark-ups. 
The expected sign of the coefficient would be the same. We include the size of the par-
ent as a measure for its productivity, and the expected sign is positive. 
Fixed costs 
The parent’s fixed costs of investment are proxied by the ratio of fixed over total assets. 
We use the ratio rather than the level of this variable as we additionally account for size 
effects in our regressions. We expect a negative impact of the fixed asset share on the 
extensive margin. The impact of this variable on the intensive margin could be insig-
nificant, according to our model, if the collateral available is sufficiently large.  
Internal funds 
In our model, we distinguish liquid funds from less liquid collateral as two determinants 
of financial constraints. Log cash flow of the parent is used to measure the internal 
funds available for financing a particular investment project. This variable should have 
a positive impact on the extensive margin of foreign activities. As in the case of fixed 
cost, its impact could be insignificant on the intensive margin if the collateral available 
is sufficiently large. In addition, we look at retained earnings of the affiliate as a meas-
ure for the liquid funds available to the affiliate to finance the intensive margin. Again, 
the expected sign is positive or insignificant.
13 
Collateral 
The debt ratio measures leverage at the parent and at the affiliate levels ex ante. We can 
interpret the debt ratio as a measure of the firms’ collateral – firms which are more 
highly leveraged ex ante have, ceteris paribus, fewer assets available that can serve as 
collateral for new credits. Hence, the expected sign for the parent debt ratio is negative 
for both the extensive and the intensive margins if the collateral constraint is binding. 
Similarly the expected sign for the affiliate debt ratio is negative for the intensive mar-
                                                 
13   Following Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997) criticism, there has been a lively debate on the usefulness of 
investment-cash flow sensitivities as a measure for financial constraints. The focus of the discussion 
have been endogeneity issues as well as issues of adequately taking into account access to external fi-
nance. See also Brown et al (2009) for an overview of this discussion. We use lagged variables to ad-
dress the simultaneity of firm-level variables issue. We also include the debt ratio, as discussed be-
low.    17
gin. Firms may also report a high leverage ratio precisely because they have taken out a 
credit in order to finance FDI. If this were the correct interpretation, we should expect a 
positive sign of the coefficient. 
Foreign market size 
In our theoretical model, we have described the attractiveness of the foreign market in 
terms of the price that firms can fetch abroad for their product. In our empirical model, 
we distinguish two aspects of foreign market size. The first is the size of the market 
measured through its GDP. The second is the state of development of a foreign market 
measured through GDP per capita. We expect a positive sign for both variables.  
Contract enforcement 
The probability of contract enforcement depends on two parameters – an index measur-
ing the difficulty of contract enforcement as well as the presence of affiliates of German 
banks abroad. The variable (weak) contract enforcement gives the number of procedures 
required to enforce contracts, and the expected impact is negative. This variable can be 
expected to influence both, the entry decision as well as the volume of activities, and we 
include it for both margins. Affiliates of German banks should be at an advantage over 
other lenders with regard to monitoring foreign affiliates and enforcing contracts. We 
use MiDi to obtain information on the volume of FDI of German banks by country, and 
we expect a positive impact on the intensive margin. 
3.3  Stylized Facts  
In Graphs 1a-1e, we visualize the differences between German MNEs and Domestic 
Firms by plotting the Kernel densities of size (Graph 1a), cost efficiency (Graph 1b), 
cash flow (Graph 1c), the debt ratio (Graph 1d), and the share of fixed assets (Graph 
1e).  
Graph 1a confirms stylized facts reported in earlier papers using firm-level data (e.g. 
Mayer and Ottaviano et al. 2008): MNEs are larger than purely domestic firms. Unre-
ported one-sided t-tests on the equality of the means between the two sub-samples show 
that this difference is statistically significant. Measuring size through the volume of 
sales gives a very similar result. MNEs also exhibit a somewhat lower share of fixed   18
assets (Graph 1e). Graph 1b shows that differences between the two types of firms in 
terms of cost efficiency are small and, in fact, not significant.  
Hence, while the dividing line between multinationals and non-multinationals is not as 
clear-cut as might have been expected on the basis of the cost efficiency of these firms, 
the dividing line is clear for measures of financial status. Multinationals have signifi-
cantly higher cash flow (Graph 1c) and lower debt ratios (Graph 1d). Prima facie, these 
graphs suggest that heterogeneity with regard to the openness and international orienta-
tion of firms could be driven by financial factors just as by real factors. 
4  Productivity versus Financial Constraints:  
Regression Results 
Our main empirical model relates financial constraints and productivity to the pattern of 
internationalization at the firm level. We are interested in two main questions. First, do 
financial constraints and productivity affect the probability of investing abroad? Second, 
do these factors affect the volume of foreign affiliates’ sales? We answer these ques-
tions in two steps. In a first step, we analyze the determinants of the firms’ extensive 
margin of FDI using the probability of investing abroad and the number of affiliates as 
dependent variable. In a second step, we analyze the sales of affiliates across countries, 
i.e. the intensive margin. We also estimate the extensive and intensive margins jointly 
using a Heckman selection model. 
4.1  Extensive Margin 
Our baseline regression for the extensive margin – the decision to enter a foreign market 
– is given by the following probit model: 
(12)  () t i t k t i t k i T S I FDI , 5 4 3 , 2 1 , 1 0 , , Pr ε α α α α α α + + + + + + = − Z Z  
where  () t k i FDI , , Pr  indicates whether a firm i has invested abroad in year t in country k. 
1 , − t i Z  ( t k, Z ) are vectors of firm-level (country-level) control variables.
14 We include the 
ratio of sales over total costs as a measure of cost efficiency. Our main proxies for fi-
                                                 
14   Firm-level regressors are lagged by one period to account for the simultaneity of the explanatory vari-
ables.   19
nancial barriers are cash flow and the debt ratio. The country-level control variables are 
GDP, GDP per capita, and the severity of contract enforcement. We additionally include 
firm size, and a full set of industry (I), German states (S), and time (T) dummies. These 
dummies capture systematic differences across industries and states as well as common 
macroeconomic effects. We also include an exporter dummy to account for the fact that 
exporting is typically a stepping stone into international markets (see Helpman et al. 
2004). This variable turns out to be positive and significant on the extensive margin re-
garding the number of affiliates abroad but insignificant regarding the probability of 
owning foreign affiliates. 
Table 5 shows the results. Column (1) has the baseline specification for the full regres-
sion sample. In columns (2)-(7), we split the sample by size, by sector (manufacturing 
versus services), and by legal status (listed versus unlisted). While the sub-sample of 
listed firms is small (6,165 versus 51,922 firm-country-year observations), it neverthe-
less serves as a useful test of the impact of financial frictions. A priori, we expect finan-
cial frictions to be less important for the listed firms with access to a larger range of fi-
nancial sources. 
Larger and more efficient firms are more likely to be multinationals. Size has a positive 
and significant impact on the probability of being a multinational, and this effect is ro-
bust across specifications. Contrary to expectations, cost efficiency is negative and sig-
nificant in some specifications. This effect is driven by certain sub-samples such as the 
large firms and the services sector firms and suggests that size is a better proxy for pro-
ductivity than cost efficiency. 
Our measure for fixed cost of market entry, the fixed asset share, has a strong and sig-
nificantly negative impact on the probability of investing abroad for all specifications, 
as expected.
15 Berman and Héricourt (2008) as well as Manova (2006) interpret the 
fixed asset share as capturing the tangibility of assets, and hence as a measure of easier 
access to external finance secured by collateral. Following their interpretation, the ex-
pected effect is positive. The negative coefficient we find suggests that, for FDI, our 
interpretation is the more appropriate one. Financial constraints have a significant and 
robust impact on the extensive margin. Cash flow is mostly positive and significant. The 
                                                 
15   An alternative interpretation of this finding is that firms with a large share of intangibles and thus 
firm-specific know-how are more likely to venture abroad. These firms would also have a lower fixed 
asset share.   20
debt ratio has an insignificant impact, consistent with the prediction of the model for 
non-binding collateral constraints. 
The marginal effects reported in Table 5 show a similar importance of productivity and 
financial frictions. Generally, however, fixed costs of entry (the fixed asset share) and 
the country-level variables are more important than variables such as size or the debt 
ratio. Mean elasticities also shows the strongest response to changes in log GDP (elas-
ticity of +0.66), cost efficiency (-0.45), firm size (+0.30), the fixed asset share (+0.23), 
and cash flow (+0.16). 
To study the interaction of productivity and financial constraints, we split the sample. 
We take firm size as an indicator for firm productivity. One of the financial variables – 
the debt ratio – is insignificant for both groups. The other – cash flow – matters for large 
firms, but not for small firms. The latter finding may look counterintuitive at first sight, 
as one would expect smaller firms to be more opaque and hence more likely to be af-
fected by financial constraints. Our finding is, however, consistent with the prediction 
of our model that financial constraints should matter the more, the more productive the 
firm and hence the more interested it is in expanding abroad.
16 Financial constraints, in 
other words, do not impede the foreign expansion of small firms because these firms are 
not productive enough to invest abroad in the first place. It is also consistent with the 
finding of Berman and Hericourt (2008) who observe that productivity has no effect on 
a firm’s export decision if the firm faces financial constraints.  
The country-level variables are significant and have the expected sign. GDP is positive 
and significant, and GDP per capita is positive and significant for the full sample and 
for most of the sample splits, thus confirming the expectation that market size matters. 
Consistent with our model, greater difficulties with contract enforcement lower the 
probability that a given German firm enters a particular country. 
In sum, our results show that parent-level financial constraints and productivity affect 
the extensive margin of foreign entry: larger, more efficient, and firms with a lower 
share of fixed assets are more likely to become multinationals. In addition, country-level 
                                                 
16   Chaney (2005) distinguishes three classes of firms, with low, intermediate and high productivity. He 
predicts that firms with low productivity are not affected by financial constraints, since investing 
abroad is not a viable option for them, even without financial constraints. More productive firms, in-
stead, are hampered by financial constraints in their foreign expansion strategy. In his model, very 
productive firms are by construction not liquidity constrained and hence not affected by financial 
constraints.   21
variables capturing contract enforcement and market size play an important role for the 
entry decision. 
4.2  Extensive Margin: Number of Affiliates 
An alternative way of looking at the extensive margin of firms’ foreign activities is to 
count the number of foreign affiliates that a given parent holds. Adding an affiliate im-
plies new set-up costs, hence the count data models presented in Table 6 provide infor-
mation on the determinants of complex FDI strategies. The count data models differ in 
their assumptions regarding the moments of the distribution and the presence of unob-
served individual heterogeneity. These models, therefore, allow controlling for the large 
share of zeros in our data to a differing degree.
17 The basic count data model is the Pois-
son model which is quite restrictive in assuming that the conditional mean of the de-
pendent variable equals the conditional variance. The Negative Binomial model allows 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity and for overdispersion. It is the preferable 
model, as the equidispersion assumption is strongly rejected for our data. Finally, zero-
inflated models assign an even higher weight to the probability of observing a zero in 
the dependent variable. 
Results from count data models support our finding that larger, less indebted parents, 
firms with a lower share of fixed assets, and firms with higher cash flow are more active 
internationally. Cost efficiency is negative or insignificant. The debt ratio has a negative 
impact on the extensive margin when using the number of foreign affiliates. This is con-
sistent with the interpretation of high debt ratios as indicators of low collateral at the 
parent level which is available to back up new lending.
18  
4.3  Intensive Margin: Sales of Affiliates 
We now focus on the sales of the foreign affiliate, while taking the decision to become a 
multinational as well as its location as given. The dependent variable  () t ijk Sales , log  are 
the sales of affiliate j of parent i in country k, and the regression equation includes con-
                                                 
17 For a detailed description of count data models, see, for example, Jones et al. (2007). 
18   Naturally, we omit the country-level variables from these regressions.   22
trol variables at the parent level ( t i, Z ), at the affiliate level ( t j, Z ), and at the country 
level ( t k, Z ): 
(13)  ( ) 0 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 5 , , log i t j t k t ijk t ijk t Sales S T α αα α α α ε =+ + + + + + ZZZ  
  
We estimate this equation as a parent-level fixed effects model; results are given in  
Table 7. In contrast to the results for the extensive margin, all our parent-level measures 
for real and financial constraints are insignificant for the intensive margin. Given that 
most parent characteristics are already absorbed by the fixed effects, variables that cap-
ture parents’ real and financial constraints do not have an additional impact on the sales 
of their affiliates. The retained earnings of the affiliate enter with a positive and signifi-
cant sign in all specifications. Hence, the availability of liquid funds which also reflects 
the profitability of the affiliate matters for the volume of activities.  
Our host-country regressors again yield the expected signs. German firms have larger 
foreign affiliates in larger countries and in countries hosting many German banks. 
While the impact of market size per se is not surprising and would, in fact, be borne out 
by many theoretical models, the positive impact of bank FDI is in support of our theo-
retical model. A greater presence of home country banks and thus familiarity of domes-
tic lenders with the foreign market should improve the collection of information on the 
foreign affiliate. This increases the probability that collateral can be collected abroad, 
thus lowering the costs of financing and increasing the volume of lending.  
In columns (2)-(5), we perform similar sample splits by size and sector. The overall 
findings are very similar with two exceptions. Size (negative) and cash flow (positive) 
are weakly significant (at the 10%-level) for the large firms. The positive sign on cash 
flow is consistent with the previous finding that financial constraints matter most for 
firms with larger foreign activities. Also, within the group of already large firms, the 
relatively small ones have higher foreign affiliate sales. 
Whereas parent-level frictions do not matter for the volume of activities, financial fric-
tions at the affiliate level have an impact on affiliate sales. This is a novel finding since, 
to the best of our knowledge, the joined impact of parent- and affiliate-level financial 
frictions has not been analyzed before. These results suggest a hierarchy of financing   23
foreign expansion, where preference is given to local funds and only if they are not suf-
ficient, parent funds are used, albeit at potentially higher opportunity cost.  
4.4  Heckman Selection Model 
So far, we have treated the decision whether to enter a foreign country and the decision 
how much to produce and sell separately. To check whether this assumption is justified, 
we estimate a Heckman selection model, which explicitly accounts for the selection into 
the FDI mode (Table 8). We use state dummies as exclusion restrictions, thus account-
ing for the fact that – historically – different regions in Germany have different degrees 
of international openness. Variables measured at the affiliate level and German bank 
FDI abroad are included in the outcome but not in the selection equation. The Mills ra-
tio in the outcome equation – affiliate sales – is insignificant, which justifies our earlier 
assumption to model the extensive and the intensive margin separately.  
Qualitative results by and large confirm earlier findings. It is interesting to see that some 
variables affect the probability of setting up an affiliate but not the volume of its sales. 
Higher cash flow has a positive impact on the selection into foreign status but not on the 
volume of sales. This effect is, consistent with the findings reported above, driven by 
the large firms. Country-level variables such as GDP and GDP per capita have a strong 
positive impact on the extensive margin, but none on the intensive margin.  
Some parent-level variables such as cost efficiency (negative), size (positive) and fixed 
asset share (negative) have a consistent impact on both margins.
19 Affiliate’s retained 
earnings have a strong and significant positive impact on the intensive margin, thus con-
firming the previous finding that distinguishing parent- and affiliate level frictions is 
important. (Weak) contract enforcement also influences both margins negatively, as ex-
pected. Bank FDI has the expected positive impact on the intensive margin. 
Finally, splitting the sample into small and large firms confirms that selection into for-
eign status is affected by financial constraints for the large firms. Market size has a posi-
tive and significant impact on the volume of foreign sales of large firms and a negative 
                                                 
19   Note that results in Table 8 are not fully comparable to those in Table 7 since we do not include par-
ent fixed effects in Table 8 but state, sector, and year fixed effects.   24
impact on sales of small firms. This reflects scale economies and the sorting of smaller 
firms into smaller markets.  
4.5  Summing Up 
Comparing our empirical results to the theoretical predictions summarized in Table 1, 
we find that they are more consistent with the scenario of non-binding than with the 
scenario of binding collateral constraints. Our measure for the parent’s internal funds, 
cash flow, is consistently significant for the extensive margin, but not for the intensive 
margin. Our measure for the parent’s collateral, the debt ratio, is mostly insignificant at 
both the extensive and intensive margin, the only exception being the Heckman selec-
tion equation for large firms and the count model of affiliates where the coefficient of 
the parent’s debt ratio is significantly negative. The fixed asset share as our measure for 
fixed cost is significantly negative at the extensive and insignificant at the intensive 
margin, with the exception of the Heckman outcome equation.  Size is always signifi-
cantly positive for the extensive margin, and, in the Heckman outcome equation, also 
for the intensive margin. Inconsistent with the model, our alternative measure of pro-
ductivity (cost efficiency) is frequently insignificant or exhibits the wrong sign. A simi-
lar observation has been made by Greenaway et al (2007) who find insignificant coeffi-
cients for their measure of productivity (TFP) on firm’s export choice, but significantly 
positive coefficients for size. 
5  Conclusions 
Multinationals are large. Earlier literature focuses on differences in productivity across 
firms as an explanation for this stylized fact. More productive firms find it easier to 
shoulder the fixed costs of foreign entry, thus being more likely to enter new markets. 
This paper analyzes the importance of financial constraints as an additional barrier to 
entry into foreign markets.  
We provide a theoretical model and empirical evidence using data on firms’ extensive 
margin of foreign activities (the probability to be a multinational firm) as well as their 
intensive margin (the volume of affiliate sales across countries). Considering real barri-
ers to entry as captured by size/productivity and entry cost, we find that larger firms and 
firms with a smaller share of fixed assets are consistently more likely to become multi-  25
nationals, and these firms also have larger foreign activities. Cost efficiency, in contrast, 
does not have the expected positive impact.  
Considering financial constraints, our empirical results confirm that these constraints 
matter for foreign expansions. Parents with larger cash flow are more likely to become 
multinationals and have more affiliates. For the intensive margin, we find a weaker im-
pact of parent-level financial constraints, but a strong positive impact of affiliate’s re-
tained earnings. This suggests a financing hierarchy for the intensive margin, with af-
filiate financing to be the first and parent financing to be the second choice. Further-
more, considering the interaction of real and financial barriers, financial constraints 
matter more for large firms because these firms are most likely to expand abroad. 
The findings of our paper have a number of implications for different literatures. To the 
literature of multinational firms, we add a mechanism through which productivity and 
financial constraints interact. Models ignoring financial constraints would predict that 
enhancement of firm productivity could improve firms’ access to foreign markets. Our 
results suggest that high productivity may be a necessary, but not a sufficient precondi-
tion for foreign expansion. Lowering financial constraints might be just as important, as 
even large and productive firms are hampered in their internationalization strategy by 
financial constraints. 
To the banking literature, we add a mechanism explaining why banks and non-financial 
firms typically expand into foreign markets in tandem. One reason for the “follow their 
customer” patterns in the data could be that home-country banks that are active abroad 
could have comparative advantages over local banks in enforcing credit repayment and 
in assessing the creditworthiness of FDI projects. This does not ultimately resolve the 
“follow their customer” question, but the specific interaction between financial and real 
barriers to entry that we stress may provide the possibility of testing this link more 
structurally.  
Finally, our findings can have implications for the international macroeconomic litera-
ture. Essentially, the financial constraints imbedded in our model are similar to financial 
accelerator mechanisms used to model the interaction between the financial sector and 
business cycles. In this sense, extensions of our model might provide useful insights 
into credit channel mechanisms in open economies and the persistence of shocks trig-
gering entry into foreign markets.     26
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7  Mathematical Appendix  
Proof of  Proposition 1 
We obtain  * x  by taking the first-order condition from (6) or (6’) respectively, setting it 









if 1 < μ  , which is required for a positive collateral to be needed.  FB π π ≤ *  follows di-
rectly from  FB x x ≤ *  and can be shown analytically by checking that  * π π > FB  when-
ever  0 > C .  
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2 




















To obtain the remaining comparative statics, we evaluate first: 
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. Using a revealed 
preference argument, it follows that the profit has to be increasing in these parameters 
as well. 
Q.E.D.  
Proof of Proposition 3 
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for x . This gives us a quadratic function of   x  which has the following solutions: 
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Since we are looking at constrained levels of sales that fall short of the second-best level 
of sales * x , the solution for the investor is to choose the larger of the two levels of sales. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Consider first x . It is straightforward to see that: 
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Finally, note that  0 >
μ d
x d
, because increasing μ relaxes the collateral constraint. To see 
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decreases in μ , for a given x . To see this, note that:   
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To see the comparative statics for π  note that they have the same signs as the compara-
tive statics for x because they follow from relaxing (or tightening) the constraints on the 
constrained choice of x . 
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Table 1: Summary of the Theoretical Model and Empirical Measurement 
This Table summarizes the comparative static results of the model presented in Section 2. See Table 2 for 






Binding collateral constraint 








Productivity (β ) 
Cost efficiency 
Sales / Total as-
sets 
+ + + + 
Foreign prices (p) 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
+ + + + 
Liquidation value (θ )   +  +  +  + 
Probability of contract 
enforcement (μ ) 
Bank FDI 
 
+  +  +  + 
Probability of no con-
tract enforcement 
( μ − 1 ) 
(Weak) contract 
enforcement 
–  –  –  – 
Fixed costs (F)  Fixed / Total 
assets  –  0  –  – 
Internal funds (L) 
Cash flow of the 
parent 
Retained earn-
ings of the affili-
ate 
+  0  +  + 
Collateral (C)  Debt ratio of the 
parent  0  0  +  + 
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Table 2: Data 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, parent-level information comes from Dafne (Bureau van Dijk) and Hop-
penstedt, affiliate level information comes from MiDi (Microdatabase Direct Investment, Deutsche 
Bundesbank). Country-level information comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
All values in €1,000 (unless otherwise indicated). Cash flow and cost efficiency are corrected for outliers 
by truncating the data at the 1st and 99th percentile. Fixed asset share, the debt ratio, and sales are cor-




Parent-level data  
Cash flow  Cash flow from operations  
Cost efficiency  Sales / total cost (cost of materials + labor cost) 
Debt ratio  Total debt / total assets 
Firms with for-
eign affiliate 
0/1 dummy for firms with foreign affiliates from Dafne-MiDi-merge 
Fixed asset share  Fixed assets / total assets 
Number of for-
eign affiliates 
Count of total number of affiliates worldwide obtained from MiDi 
Sector defini-
tions 
We use two definition of sectors: (i) A broad definition of 28 sectoral groups is used 
for sample splits (see also Table 5), (ii) a narrow definition of about 64 sectors at the 
2-digit-level, used to generate sector-level dummy variables 
Sales Turnover   
Affiliate-level data  
Debt ratio  Total debt / total assets  
Sales  Aggregate turnover of parent i in country j in year t, i.e. data are aggregated across all 
affiliates in a given country for a given parent and weighted by the parent’s owner-
ship share 
Retained earn-
ings / total assets 
Revenue reserves / total assets  
Country-level data 
Bank FDI  Aggregate volume of FDI of German banks in country j in year t, calculated from 
MiDi in €1,000 
(Weak) contract 
enforcement 
From the World Bank’s “Doing business” database (http://www.doingbusiness.org/), 
we use the variable “Enforcing contracts / Procedures (number)”  
GDP  Host country GDP per capita in constant USD, converted into €bn, World Bank 
(2008) 
GDP per capita  Host country GDP per capita per capita in constant USD, converted into €1,000, 
World Bank (2008) 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
This Table provides summary statistics for the regressions reported below. GDP per capita is in €1,000. 
Negative values in ln(GDP per capita) hence come from countries with a GDP per capita of less than 
€1,000. Minimum and maximum values for affiliate-level variables are not reported due to confidentiality 
reasons. 
a) Extensive margin 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Cash  flow  (log)  176,034 5.347 2.245 0.000  10.653 
Cost  efficiency  136,093 1.344 0.444 0.383 4.750 
Debt  ratio  203,325 0.561 0.291 0.000 0.999 
Exporter  dummy    211,205 0.072 0.259 0.000 1.000 
FDI  dummy  211,205 0.020 0.140 0.000 1.000 
Fixed / total assets  184,882  0.267  0.269  0.000  0.970 
Size  (log)  211,143 7.825 2.404 0.000  18.922 
b) Intensive margin 
 Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Affiliate-level       
Debt ratio  17,475  0.516  0.269  …  … 
Retained earnings / total assets  17,475  0.059  0.132  …  … 
Sales (log)  16,582  10.095  1.286  …  … 
Parent-level       
Cash  flow  (log)  3,980 11.171  4.207  0.000 19.441 
Cost efficiency  3,682 1.307 0.330 0.393 4.690 
Debt  ratio  5,269 0.433 0.229 0.000 0.999 
Fixed assets / total assets  4,924  0.246  0.219  0.000  0.963 
Number of foreign affiliates  4,222  4.429  9.878  1.000  … 
Size (log)  5,129 13.919  3.726  3.296 21.484 
Country-level        
Bank  FDI  (log)  296 11.601  2.282  4.754 16.812 
(Weak) contract enforcement  
(number of procedures)  243 36.078  6.373 21.000 51.000 
GDP  (log)  438 4.541 1.873  -0.664 9.762 
GDP per capita (log)  434  1.707  1.386  -1.853  4.001  34
Table 4: Corrected Versus Regression Sample 
This table compares the sample corrected for outliers (“corrected sample”) and the sample used for the regressions in Table 6 (“Regression sample”). The two samples differ 
because of missing observations for the explanatory variables.  
  Regression sample  Corrected sample 
 Number  %  Sales  
(million €)  % Number %  Sales  
(million €)  % 
Agriculture & Fishing  1,172 1.63 5,242 0.14 2,435 1.49 12,744 0.16 
Chemicals 1,219 1.70 158,715 4.23 1,908 1.17 251,227 3.17 
Construction 8,166 11.36 136,271 3.63 17,220 10.56 184,209 2.32 
Education 273 0.38 3,293 0.09 798 0.49 17,049 0.21 
Energy 2,308 3.21 183,807 4.90 4,271 2.62 598,190 7.54 
Financial services  323 0.45 25,840 0.69 1,906 1.17 109,836 1.38 
Food & Tobacco  1,568 2.18 169,024 4.50 2,865 1.76 387,082 4.88 
Furniture 1,043 1.45 54,521 1.45 1,804 1.11 49,107 0.62 
Glass 902 1.25 66,058 1.76 1,515 0.93 52,436 0.66 
Health 2,302 3.20 75,202 2.00 4,596 2.82 158,890 2.00 
Hotels & Restaurants  600 0.83 7,202 0.19 1,549 0.95 17,713 0.22 
Coking 84 0.12 82,420 2.20 163 0.10 64,276 0.81 
Leather 62 0.09 3,122 0.08 99 0.06 3,052 0.04 
Machinery 3,502 4.87 262,599 7.00 5,934 3.64 317,839 4.01 
Metals 4,063 5.65 138,351 3.69 7,619 4.67 283,242 3.57 
Mining 279 0.39 13,555 0.36 572 0.35 128,760 1.62 
Office equipment  2,695 3.75 235,198 6.27 4,718 2.89 253,050 3.19 
Other services  2,382 3.31 72,376 1.93 6,482 3.97 213,489 2.69 
Paper 1,566 2.18 62,047 1.65 3,052 1.87 138,107 1.74 
Real estate & Business services  13,854 19.27 595,754 15.87 44,063 27.02 1,536,041 19.37 
Rubber & Plastics  1,248 1.74 82,808 2.21 2,152 1.32 88,540 1.12 
Textiles 736 1.02 22,114 0.59 1,335 0.82 55,160 0.70 
Trade & repair  16,706 23.23 1,041,823 27.76 34,642 21.24 2,047,607 25.82 
Transport & Communication  3,460 4.81 158,111 4.21 8,341 5.11 631,385 7.96 
Vehicles 786 1.09 82,430 2.20 1,436 0.88 297,970 3.76 
Wood 435 0.60 11,598 0.31 920 0.56 20,855 0.26 
n.e.c 177 0.25 4,149 0.11 684 0.42 13,808 0.17 
Total 71,911 100.00 3,753,631 100.00 163,079 100.00 7,931,660 100.00  35
Table 5: Probability of Owning Affiliates Abroad 
This table reports results of probit regressions using a 0/1 dummy variable of owning foreign affiliates as the dependent variable. All explanatory variables are at the parent 
level (P). Sample splits are at the sample median. Sector, state, and year fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported. ***, **, * = sig-
nificant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
 Full  sample  Large  Small  Manufacturing  Services  Listed  Unlisted 
Log size t-1 (P)  0.009*** 0.011*** 0.006***  0.013***  0.006***  0.013***  0.008*** 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Cost efficiency t-1 (P)  -0.010*** -0.015***  -0.003  -0.008 -0.010*** -0.006  -0.011*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.003) 
Debt ratio t-1 (P)  -0.005 -0.016 0.004  -0.011  0.004  0.030  -0.006 
  (0.005) (0.010) (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.021)  (0.005) 
Log cash flow t-1 (P)  0.005*** 0.009***  0.001  0.004**  0.005***  0.008***  0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Fixed asset share t-1 (P)  -0.037*** -0.051*** -0.017***  -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.097***  -0.031*** 
  (0.007) (0.013) (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.032)  (0.007) 
Log GDP  0.019*** 0.026*** 0.014***  0.021***  0.017***  0.026***  0.018*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Log GDP per capita  0.002** 0.004**  0.001  0.001  0.004***  0.011***  0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
(Weak) contract en-
forcement 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001**  -0.001  -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Exporter (0/1)  0.000 0.003  -0.003**  -0.002  0.001  -0.007  -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.002) 
Observations  58,087 29,493 28,594  32,537 22,681  6165  51,922 
Pseudo R²  0.134 0.138 0.108  0.153  0.124  0.235  0.121 
log likelihood  -9,500 -5,899 -3,532  -5,446 -3,553 -1,222  -8,197   36
Table 6: Determinants of the Number of Affiliates 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the Poisson (Negative Binomial, Zero-Inflated Poisson 
ZIP) regression using the total number of affiliates of each German firm as the dependent variable. 
Year fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 
10%-level. 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Poisson  NegBin  ZIP 
Log size t-1 (P)  0.008*** 0.004*** 0.012*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Cost efficiency t-1 (P)  -0.006*** -0.001  -0.009** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Debt ratio t-1 (P)  -0.016*** -0.001 -0.024*** 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) 
Log cash flow t-1 (P)  0.007*** 0.002*** 0.009*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Fixed asset share t-1 (P)  -0.048*** -0.019*** -0.065*** 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) 
Exporter (0/1)  0.009*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations  71,911 71,911 71,911 
Pseudo R²  0.677 0.321 0.322 
log likelihood  -27,438 -18,295 -20,976 
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Table 7: Determinants of the Volume of Affiliate Sales 
This table reports results of parent fixed effects panel regressions using the log sales of affiliates of 
domestic multinational i in host country j as the dependent variable. (P) = parent-level variables, (A) = 
affiliate-level variables. In Panel (b), sample splits are at the sample median. Standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
 
Full sam-
ple  Large Small 
Manufac-
turing  Services 
Log size t-1 (P)  -0.029 -0.128* 0.055  -0.014  -0.078 
  (0.048) (0.076) (0.061) (0.060) (0.093) 
Cost efficiency t-1 (P)  -0.112 -0.014 -0.118 -0.479 -0.059 
  (0.142) (0.332) (0.150) (0.322) (0.184) 
Debt ratio t-1 (P)  -0.165 -0.072 -0.285 -0.065 -0.100 
  (0.277) (0.404) (0.404) (0.375) (0.483) 
Log cash flow t-1 (P)  0.033 0.125* -0.039 0.033  0.088 
  (0.045) (0.073) (0.056) (0.057) (0.088) 
Fixed asset share  t-1 (P)  0.009 0.021 0.049 -0.250  -0.212 
  (0.217) (0.262) (0.434) (0.322) (0.424) 
Retained earnings / total assets t-1(A)  0.585*** 0.447** 0.868***  0.535*** 0.777** 
  (0.137) (0.176) (0.220) (0.155) (0.305) 
Debt ratio t-1 (A)  -0.086 -0.017 -0.175 -0.092 0.001 
  (0.077) (0.103) (0.116) (0.089) (0.169) 
Log GDP  0.139*** 0.175*** 0.088*** 0.138*** 0.141*** 
  (0.018) (0.024) (0.027) (0.020) (0.038) 
Log GDP per capita  0.084*** 0.094***  0.056  0.084***  0.094* 
  (0.024) (0.033) (0.035) (0.028) (0.053) 
Log bank FDI  0.066*** 0.043*** 0.097*** 0.061*** 0.100*** 
  (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.025) 
(Weak) contract enforcement  -0.012*** -0.009* -0.018***  -0.011***  -0.017** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Constant  8.531*** 8.769*** 8.319*** 8.827*** 8.155*** 
  (0.337) (0.627) (0.441) (0.542) (0.619) 
Observations  3,507 1,796 1,711 2,363 1,052 
R²  0.134 0.142 0.140 0.138 0.157 
Cross-sections  864 283 581 537 341   38
Table 8: Heckman Selection Model 
This table reports results of a Heckman selection model using the log sales of affiliates of domestic 
multinational i in host country j as the dependent variable. (P) = parent- level variables, (A) = affiliate-
level variables. State, sector and year fixed effects included. Sector fixed effects included in the selec-
tion equation. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
 Full  sample  Large  Small 
  Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome    Selection 
Log size t-1 (P)  0.316***  0.144***  0.360***  0.126***  0.006  0.140*** 
  (0.047) (0.014) (0.055) (0.024) (0.147) (0.032) 
Cost efficiency t-1 (P)  -0.540*** -0.179*** -0.450*** -0.214*** -0.525*** -0.050 
  (0.094) (0.041) (0.128) (0.057) (0.166) (0.066) 
Debt ratio t-1 (P)  0.047  -0.073  -0.152  -0.200**  0.240  0.071 
  (0.113) (0.056) (0.168) (0.083) (0.225) (0.084) 
Log cash flow t-1 (P)  0.005  0.064***  -0.007  0.096***  0.014  0.019 
  (0.028) (0.013) (0.040) (0.018) (0.052) (0.020) 
Fixed asset share t-1 (P)  -0.688*** -0.517*** -0.903*** -0.479*** 0.283 -0.448***
  (0.220) (0.091) (0.276) (0.134) (0.506) (0.135) 
Log GDP  0.090  0.291***  0.210***  0.299***  -0.594**  0.288*** 
  (0.081) (0.009) (0.077) (0.013) (0.260) (0.014) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.017  0.037***  -0.047  0.045**  0.068  0.028 
  (0.038) (0.014) (0.048) (0.019) (0.073) (0.022) 
(Weak) contract enforcement  -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.016*** 0.014  -0.017***
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.017) (0.004) 
Retained earnings /   0.326**    0.471**    -0.062   
total assets t-1 (A)  (0.155)    (0.220)    (0.215)   
Debt ratio t-1 (A)  -0.044    -0.189*    0.070   
  (0.083)  (0.114)  (0.122)  
Log bank FDI  0.090***    0.088***    0.091***   
  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.022)  
Constant 5.903***  -5.045*** 4.183**  -5.461*** 16.814***  -4.832***
  (1.704) (0.572) (1.960) (0.518) (5.285) (0.664) 
Observations 57,672  57,672  24,196 24,196 33,476 33,476 
Censored  observations  55,373 55,373 22,804 22,804 32,569 32,569 
Mill’s  ratio  0.166 0.166 0.337 0.337 -2.083  -2.083 
Standard  error  0.322 0.322 0.297 0.297 1.042 1.042 
ρ  0.183 0.183 0.345 0.345 -1.000 -1.000  39
Graph 1: Firm Characteristics by Multinational Status 
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